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FAIRNESS OPINIONS: HOW FAIR ARE THEY
AND WHY WE SHOULD DO NOTHING
ABOUT IT
WILLIAM J. CARNEY*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Fiflis has provided an interesting description of the legal the-
ories available to hold investment bankers liable for negligence for giving
fairness opinions in takeout mergers and management buyouts.1 Profes-
sor Fiffis has focused his presentation on a limited set of investment
bankers' opinions-those ostensibly addressed to shareholders, or in-
tended for shareholders' consumption.
Had he chosen, Professor Fiflis could have given us a parade of hor-
ribles, showing the dubious independence of investment bankers in all
kinds of transactions. Investment bankers produce these opinions at the
onset of takeover bids to permit directors to decide whether to defend
against a bid; to justify the extent of the defense; and to justify arm's-
length mergers, recapitalizations, and other transactions.2 One could re-
cite any number of cases in which investment bankers have given opin-
ions about fairness, only to have a bid come in later at a price well above
the range or price expressed in the opinion.3 Similarly, different invest-
* Charles Howard Candler Professor, Emory University Law School. I thank William L.
Floyd, of the law firm of Long, Aldridge & Norman in Atlanta, for his helpful discussions on this
subject. I also acknowledge the work of Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, for providing the
inspiration for this title. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are
They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27. At the deadline for submission of the
manuscript for these comments, I did not have access to a complete version of Professor Fiflis'
paper, so it is possible that some of my comments may not fully address his article as it appears in
print.
1. Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497
(1992).
2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What
Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27.
3. For example, when management proposed a management buyout of Stokely-Van Camp at
$55 per share, which an investment bank declared "fair and attractive," a third-party bid appeared
at $77 per share. See Robert McGough, Fairness for Hire, FORBES, July 29, 1985, at 52; Longstreth
Says Federal, State Laws Are Not Assuring Fairness in Buyouts, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40,
at 1908, 1909 (Oct. 14, 1983); Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers'Fairness Opinions in
Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 121 n.12 (1986). In Kramer v. Western Pacific
Industries, Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 350 (Del. 1988), an investment banker opined that a bid of $155 was
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ment bankers can arrive at widely differing estimates of a fair price.4 In
one merger transaction, we witnessed an investment banker lower its esti-
mate of the value of the target and raise its estimate of the value of the
bidder to justify an exchange ratio.5 In a recapitalization transaction the
market price of the stock quickly exceeded the investment banker's esti-
mate of fairness, which required an increase in the cash payment to
shareholders from seventy to eighty dollars.6 In one case, the investment
banker added five dollars per share to its estimate of the value of a man-
agement recapitalization when a hostile bidder raised its bid.7 In an-
other, an investment banker set the value of a company at forty-five
dollars per share in response to a hostile bid, and within a year declared
that thirty-eight dollars and fifty cents was fair in a friendly acquisition.'
In a squeezeout merger, a banker claimed that twelve dollars was fair,
even though it previously had stated that sixteen dollars was an excellent
value for the shares.9 In other cases in which managers were fending off
bids, investment bankers made predictions about future values of the tar-
get that were off the mark in spectacular fashion.10
In short, one might argue that Professor Fiflis has been too kind, since
his paper does not contain the parade of horribles I have just recited.
That is, however, not the point. Rather, I argue that Professor Fiflis has
misconceived the role of the fairness opinion. Rationales for imposing
fair, only to see a subsequent bid at $163. See also In re Trans World Airlines Shareholder Litig.,
No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (investment banker concluded that $20
cash plus $20 in notes was fair, followed by a bid of $20 cash and $30 in notes).
4. See, eg., Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 29 n.16 (citing Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482
A.2d 335, 339 (Del. Ch. 1984) (estimates ranging from $53 to $85 per share); Smith v. Shell Petro-
leum, Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ] 95,316 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1990)
(parent's expert said $55 was fair while the subsidiary's banker stated that $75 was the lower end of
fairness); Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, 1985 WL 4449 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985)
(from $52 to $122); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 566-67 (Del. Ch. 1977) (from $7.25 to
$9.50)). See also Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166 (Del. 1991) ($6 to $10 from
opposing experts).
5. In re Triton Group Shareholders Litig., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
195,876 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1991).
6. FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 727 F. Supp. 1182, 1186-87 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
7. Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 774-78 (D. Del.
1988).
8. Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Or. 1984).
9. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
10. See, eg., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T94,514, at 93,273 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (predictions of a range of prices for 1991
of $159 to $247 when actual prices for the twelve months ended Nov. 7, 1991 ranged from $72 to
$125, with a closing price of $87.75), aft'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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liability on investment bankers should not be drawn from cases involving
accountants. This is an area in which we should observe Cardozo's cau-
tion to beware of metaphors, or in this case, similes. 1 Instead, we should
examine with care the distinctive role played by investment bankers in
corporate America.
It is more useful to think of fairness opinions as assuring the continued
application of the business judgment rule during an era when it has been
under severe attack. Viewed in that light, the fairness opinion has served
corporations and their stockholders well. I believe that fairness opinions
exist for two reasons: a judicial belief in the determinacy of value, and
legal rules that shelter the business judgment of a board when based on
reliance on the opinion of experts. Except in rare instances, investment
bankers do not deliver fairness opinions for the benefit of public share-
holders. Further, the nature of the fairness opinion is such that neither
courts nor investors should attach too much weight to it nor impose lia-
bility because of it, except in instances of fraud.
I. FOR WHOM Do INVESTMENT BANKERS DELIVER OPINIONS?
A. The Real Function of Fairness Opinions
The purposes of the business judgment rule are at least two. First, the
rule confines directors and courts to their own fields of competence. Sec-
ond, and more important, it encourages directors to take reasonable risks
in the face of uncertainty.1 2 The takeover movement of the 1980s high-
lighted the problems facing directors in making decisions. The decisions
involved larger sums, and the difficulties of obtaining complete informa-
tion were all that much more obvious. A mistake under these conditions
could be a billion dollar mistake.13
That by itself was not bad, although it would make even the boldest
director fear legal liability. But when courts began to second-guess direc-
tors, the message became quite clear: the business judgment rule ap-
peared to be eroding.14
11. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926), cited in Fiflis, supra note 1, at 500.
12. See generally Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
13. For a general description of the complexities of responding to unsolicited bids, see William
J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market For Corporate Control: An Agency
Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385.
14. Recognizing that unsolicited takeover bids place management in a peculiar position, similar
but not identical to a conflict of interest, the Delaware Supreme Court crafted an intermediate stan-
1992]
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The Delaware Supreme Court created more mischief than it knew in
the Trans Union case when it stated that the Trans Union Board had an
obligation to investigate the intrinsic value of Trans Union before agree-
ing to sell the company.15 Because of past references to the market price
of the company's stock as below its "intrinsic value," the court held that
the board could not rely on the market price alone in determining that
the price offered, a thirty-eight percent premium over the market, was
fair.16 While the opinion was explicit that fairness opinions were not
required as a matter of law, it was also explicit that something more than
knowledge of the market price was required, and that somehow the
Board should have tried to determine the intrinsic value of the stock.17
Since that time, the Delaware courts have had to repeat their claim that
fairness opinions are not required as a matter of law, apparently because
litigants believed the holding more than the dicta in the Trans Union
case. 18
Now, I am not a believer in intrinsic values of economic goods. 19 Jus-
tice White expressed it well in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, when he criticized
the majority's reference to the value of stock:
dard of review in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985), requiring
managers first to demonstrate a threat to the corporation and then that the response is "reasonable
in relation to the threat posed." Id. at 955.
The Delaware Supreme Court hinted that the Chancery Court had intruded too far into the
board's domain in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989).
The court mentioned some lower court opinions that the Time plaintiffs had used to argue that only
a coercively structured two-tier bid was justification for management resistance. The court stated
that this would involve substituting the court's view of what is a better deal for that of the board of
directors, and "[t]o the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so in certain of its
opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis." Id, at
1153.
15. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
16. Id. at 878.
17. Id.
18. The dicta appears id. at 881. Subsequent restatements are found in Oberly v. Kirby, 592
A.2d 445, 472 (Del. 1991); Seagraves v. Urstadt Property Co., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 4, 1989); Ince & Co. v. Silgan Corp., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,842 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 1991). See also Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578
(11th Cir. 1988). But see NCR Corp. v. AT&T, 761 F. Supp. 475, 492 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (rejecting
adoption of a leveraged ESOP as a defense without a fairness opinion as to the unsolicited takeover
bid).
19. The leading finance text contains no reference whatever to "intrinsic value," See generally
RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (2d ed. 1984). For
a general description of valuation, see id. at 61-83; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy
in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 875, 885-89 (1983); David Cohen, Comment,
Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal, 34 EMORY L.J. 117 (1985).
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[T]he meaning of this phrase eludes me, for it implicitly suggests that stocks
have some "true value" that is measurable by a standard other than their
market price. While the Scholastics of Medieval times professed a means to
make such a valuation of a commodity's "worth," I doubt that the federal
courts of our day are similarly equipped.20
I believe he would make the same comment about investment bankers.
A good is only worth what a willing buyer will pay for it - no more, no
less. The Delaware Supreme Court ignored this fundamental truth of
economics, ignored the efficient market in which the company's stock
was traded, and concluded that the board either must have additional
information before deciding to recommend a sale to the shareholders or
face the risk of liability.
That single opinion could be called the Investment Bankers' Civil Re-
lief Act of 1985. Other opinions overthrew board actions for lack of suf-
ficient information and disinterested advice.21 The strong message was
that boards could protect their decisions only if they met a quantitative
standard of information set by the courts. 22 Only if they met this thresh-
old could they be permitted to say they had made an informed business
judgment. I believe these decisions were misguided to the extent the
courts second-guessed the decisions of boards about how much informa-
tion they required before acting. A decision about the quantity of infor-
mation required for a decision is no less a business judgment than the
decision of what to do about it.23
The pressure to use investment bankers was reinforced by specific stat-
utory language protecting directors from liability when they rely on the
advice of experts. This language is found not only in Delaware's act, but
also in virtually every such statute in the country.24 These statutes pro-
20. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 255 (1988) (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
21. See, eg., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)
(failure of board to be sufficiently critical of fairness opinion). I have a personal recollection of the
impact of this decision, recounted infra text following note 54, when the investment bankers in-
volved in the Hanson Trust decision made every effort to make a record that additional information
would not change their opinion.
22. The model was set in Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275, in which the court cited the proce-
dures followed in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980), as an example of
the procedures omitted by the SCM board. The result, of course, has been the production of a script
for the successful defense of board actions defending against a hostile bid.
23. William J. Carney, Section 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Pro-
ject: Restatement or Misstatement?, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 239, 281-83 (1988).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991); REv. MODEL BUSINEss CORP. ACT § 8.30(b)
(1984).
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vide that a director shall "be fully protected in relying in good faith upon
... information, opinions, reports or statements presented•., by any...
person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such
other person's professional or expert competence. . 25
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that every board in the
country, faced with a decision about selling the company or engaging in
any other transaction in which an expert's opinion would provide some
cover, would seek such an opinion. These opinions served primarily to
protect decisions boards had already decided to make and to protect
board members from huge potential liabilities.
These opinions provide less information than they do protection. And
the protection is not for shareholders, but for the directors themselves,
and for their decision. The investment banker's fairness opinion thus be-
comes another costly tax that legal rules impose on business transactions.
B. Disclosure to Investors: By Contract or By Mandate?
Professor Fiflis squarely addresses the doctrinal difficulties involved in
arguing that fairness opinions are produced for the benefit of sharehold-
ers. In his discussion of Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., he notes that
the case is grounded on the unique circumstances of a buyout, in which
the court could argue that shareholder, rather than corporate, action was
involved, and that the special committee served as an agent for the share-
holders.26 He then examines whether that rationale would be available in
other transactional contexts as well. But he does not examine whether
Schneider's rationale was correct. It was not. The proposed transaction
involved a merger, which, as a matter of Delaware law, required a vote of
the board.27 Thus it involved corporate action, not shareholder action, at
least within the conventions of corporate law. As one article pointed out,
the board "has an independent and non-delegable statutory duty to ap-
prove the proposed transaction: it is only if the board approves the pro-
posed merger that it goes to the shareholders with the Board's
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991).
26. Fiflis, supra note 1, at 506 (discussing Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 571
(App. Div. 1990)).
27. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 194,194 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1991). For further
criticism of the Schneider decision, see John C. Coffee, Jr., New York's New Doctrine of Constructive
Privity, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 1990, at 5; Donald Lund, Comment, Toward a Standard for Third.Party
Advisor Liability in Mergers and Buy-Outs: Schneider and Beyond, 52 U. Pi-r. L. REV. 603, 618-20
(1991).
[Vol. 70:523
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recommendation."28 Further, Professor Fiflis ignores Delaware courts'
explicit holdings that there is no legal obligation to obtain a fairness opin-
ion for the benefit of shareholders.2 9
Agency is a consensual relationship, and consent by the investment
bankers to serve as shareholders' agents is generally lacking in the con-
text of fairness opinions.3" There is some evidence about the nature of
the contracts investment bankers enter into with boards, but Professor
Fiflis does not discuss it. In some hostile takeover situations, the invest-
ment banker's fairness opinion will be delivered for one price if it is avail-
able only for the board and management, and for a higher price if it is
made public."a Obviously, the possibility of public disclosure is a con-
templated contingency, but it is equally obvious that bankers regard such
disclosure as a negative event for which they demand a higher fee. There
may, of course, be cases in which investment bankers contract to repre-
sent public shareholders, but I suspect these have been the exceptions,
and that few well-informed bankers will do so today, given the current
state of New York law.32
In the context of a takeout merger or a management buyout of public
shareholders, there is no chance of keeping the opinion private because
Schedule 13E-3 requires its disclosure.33 I am informed by a wise and
experienced practitioner that the same is true today in arm's-length
mergers because the SEC staff insists on equivalent disclosures. Under
these circumstances, fee arrangements will not contain two separate
scales since there is nothing voluntary about the disclosure. Would the
opinion otherwise be disclosed to public shareholders? One can only
conclude that the perceived need to mandate such disclosure suggests
28. Herbert M. Wachtell et al., Investment Banker Liability to Shareholders in the Sale-of-Con-
trol Context, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1990, at 1. The law has changed somewhat in Model Act jurisdic-
tions, where the board can now forward a proposal to the shareholders without recommendation, if
it provides the reasons for doing so. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.03(b)(1) (1984).
29. See supra note 18 and cases cited therein.
30. Lund, supra note 27, at 620. Certainly investment bankers would not voluntarily assume
such sweeping fiduciary duties.
31. See, eg., Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1054, 1060 (1989); Anderson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430 (D. Minn. 1984). But see Hecco
Ventures v. Avalon Energy Corp., 606 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (fixed fee).
32. See, e-g., Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
33. Schedule 13E-3, Item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1991). I am informed that the SEC staff
requires similar information in connection with self-tender offers under Schedule 13E-4, 17 C.F.R.
240.13e-101 (1991), and in connection with arm's-length mergers under Rule 145, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.145 (1991) and Form S-4, although these requirements are not explicit in the forms.
1992]
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that it would not. The SEC seems to admit in its rules mandating disclo-
sure to shareholders that the opinion is not produced for them, but for
the board.34
All of this discussion begins with a handful of cases involving the lia-
bility of accountants to third parties for negligent audits. 35 But the anal-
ogy to the accountants' certificate is less than compelling. Accountants
produce a certificate knowing that someone other than the board will
attach significance to it. The modem theory of the firm argues that an
independent audit is one way in which managers promise shareholders,
prospective investors, and creditors that they will not divert funds for
their own purposes, and that the audit is a means by which investors and
creditors can be assured of monitoring managers' performance.36
Viewed in this light, the early cases and their progeny are outdated, since
accountants are today on notice that shareholders, prospective investors,
and creditors would rely on their certificate. And yet the law has not
gone that far, as Professor Fiflis has pointed out in his discussion of
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 37
The New York case law is troubling on a variety of scores. The
Wells 38 opinion asserts that the special committee of the board was con-
stituted to serve the shareholders by determining the fairness of a man-
agement buyout.3 9 The opinion cites no facts in support of that
conclusion; it merely asserts this based on the pleadings. One could just
as easily conclude that the special committee was created to insulate the
transaction from charges of conflict of interest and to shift the burden of
proof on the fairness question from the directors to the plaintiffs.
A recent decision refusing to dismiss a suit against investment bankers
illustrates the point. In Coronet Insurance Co. v. GACC Holding Co. ,40
34. See Coffee, supra note 27.
35. See, eg., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (holding accountants not
liable); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985) (distinguish-
ing between lenders who relied on audited financial statements on the basis of "near privity"). But
see Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (holding accountants liable).
36. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIri. ECON. 305, 323 (1976).
37. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985), discussed in Fiflis, supra note 1, at 500.
38. Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1987), rev'd
on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1988).
39. Id. at 2. Coffee, supra note 27, states that the decision could be read as a misrepresentation
case, but "the language of the decision comes close to adopting an agency theory .. "
40. No. 90-c-07189, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12120 (N.D. I1. Aug. 27, 1991) (applying New
York law). The investment banker's contract with the debtor expressly provided that "nothing in
[V/ol. 70:523
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the investment bankers gave an opinion on the interest rate required to
bring reset notes to 101% of par, and were sued on the theory that the
noteholder-plaintifs were third-party beneficiaries of the contract be-
tween the debtor corporation and the investment bankers. The court
noted that the Noteholders Agreement required the use of an investment
banker to reset the interest rate, and held that this created a reasonable
expectation of reliance by the noteholders on the investment bankers.
No such agreement exists in the ordinary takeover situation.
Professor Fiflis relies on Judge Duffy's dissent in Weinberger v. UOP
for his conclusion that Wells would lead to a holding that minority
shareholders would have standing in Delaware to sue investment bankers
for negligent preparation of a fairness opinion.41 He has not discussed a
1990 opinion of the Chancery Court, In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders
Litigation, that distinguished Wells because the investment advisor in
Wells was hired by a special committee charged solely with determining
the fairness of the transaction for the shareholders.42 That distinction
seems largely artificial, since the Shoe-Town transaction was a manage-
ment-led buyout, as was that in Wells. Vice Chancellor Chandler re-
jected a reading of the Chancery Court opinion in Weinberger v. UOP as
providing a blanket rule that investment bankers owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders in rendering fairness opinions.4" The language of the opin-
this agreement, expressed or implied, is intended to confer on holders of the securities... any rights
or remedies under or by reason of this agreement." Id. at *1. The court recognized the general rule
that allows disclaimers of third-party rights, but questioned "the underlying soundness of applying
that rule under the particular circumstances present here, where the party alleged to have committed
a breach is on notice that its own contract has its genesis in a prior contract establishing both the
existence of a beneficiary and obvious reliance by the beneficiary on the services at issue." Id. at *9.
The court ignored the contrary holding of City of New York v. Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc., 554 N.Y.S.2d
900, 901 (App. Div. 1990).
41. Fiflis, supra note 1, at 503 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)). In
In Re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, No. 9483, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *19 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 12, 1990), the Chancery Court noted its own opinion in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d
1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981), to the effect that "... . Plaintiff has offered no authority to indicate that
an investment banking firm rendering a fairness opinion as to the terms of a merger owes the same
fiduciary duty to the minority as does the majority .... "
42. Shoe-Town, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *20-21. The Chancery Court attempted to distinguish
Wells because the investment banker that advised the special committee in Shoe-Town was hired by
management, rather than by the special committee, as in Wells. Id. at *20. But this only means that
the disinterestedness of the investment banker was subject to question in Shoe-Town, not that its
contractual obligations were different. The statement that Professor Fiflis had not discussed the
Shoe-Town decision refers to the paper presented at the conference, which formed the basis for these
comments.
43. Id. at *19-20.
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ion on the subject is fairly sweeping:
Indeed, it escapes reason to say that an investment bank hired by a manage-
ment group taking a company private, such as in the present situation,
would stand in a relationship with a given corporation and its stockholders
similar to the relationship of a trustee to his cestui que trust. [citation omit-
ted] In addition, because a fairness opinion or an outside valuation is not
an absolute requirement under Delaware law, it makes little sense to strap
those investment banks, who are retained, with the duties of a fiduciary.
44
This Chancery Court opinion is consistent with the law in at least
some jurisdictions other than New York.45 This is not to deny that other
courts have held that investment bankers can be liable to shareholders
for negligent preparation of fairness opinions. 46 It is, however, to deny
that this extension of liability represents good policy.
II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND
ACCOUNTANTS' CERTIFICATES
A. The Objects of Measurement of Fairness Opinions and Accountants'
Certificates
There are distinct differences in what accountants and investment
bankers measure that should give pause in using the analogy to account-
ants to justify imposing negligence liability on investment bankers. Ac-
countants verify observable historical facts that have been recorded in
business records. They can seek evidence to support the entries in these
records. Because of the objectivity of the facts they examine, they can
establish regular audit procedures designed to assure, with reasonable
certainty, that a company's financial records fairly reflect its financial
condition. Indeed, if there is a criticism of what accountants do, it is that
they are so bound to historical transaction records that their work is of
little use in determining the value of an enterprise.' 7 That value is deter-
mined less by past transactions than by future transactions and the future
revenues they will produce.
Professor Fiflis correctly notes the lack of an agreed definition of fair-
44. Id. at *21-22.
45. Lund, supra note 27, at 605-08 (discussing Pennsylvania law).
46. Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054,
1060 (1989); Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105 (D.R.I. 1990); Schneider v.
Lazard Freres & Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1990).
47. George J. Benston, Accounting Numbers and Economic Values, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 161
(1982).
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ness.4" In Delaware, a management leveraged buyout presumably trig-
gers a Revlon obligation to put the company into an auction, which
suggests that a fairness opinion must address the probable outcome of an
auction.49 On the other hand, the measure of fairness in a cash take-out
merger is less obvious. One might argue that the company is in effect
being sold to a majority shareholder, which should trigger Revlon, but
this is inconsistent with the realities, in which the majority shareholder is
merely exercising powers that all investors knew in advance it possessed
and for which it presumably paid a control premium." Thus, we must
consider whether the minority is only entitled to some measure of firm
value less a minority discount. Even that begs the question of what value
we should use. Should we assume that the minority is under no obliga-
tion to sell, and is entitled to bargain at arm's length with the majority?
As I said, that may be a useful fiction, but it remains very much a fiction.
B. The Difficulties With Fairness Predictions
Whatever legal measure we set for fairness only deals with the easiest
of the problems in determining it. It is easy to give fairness opinions
when an auction has been conducted, and every potential bidder has had
the opportunity to inspect the selling corporation before deciding
whether to bid. In a fairness opinion delivered under circumstances in
which no auction has been held, as in a take-out merger, the investment
banker is asked to render an opinion about the probable behavior of
many participants in the market without observing them. This is the
most hypothetical of exercises, one economists traditionally avoid in
favor of observing revealed preferences. The investment banker cannot
predict with accuracy the fit of the target's business with that of all pro-
spective bidders. In many cases, the investment banker cannot foresee
the particular synergies that might impel one firm to bid. For that rea-
son, investment bankers cannot specify a single price that is "fair." They
can only specify a range of prices that reflect their educated guesses
about the probable range of synergies available to various buyers. The
reports are full of cases in which investment bankers do no more than
48. Fiflis, supra note 1, at 517; see also Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 30-34.
49. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
50. See generally William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Con-
trol Premiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1987). In a recapitalization, the Chan-
cery Court was offered the opportunity to say that the Revlon duties were triggered, but declined to
do so. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 801-04 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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indicate a range of fairness or whether a particular price falls within such
a range.51 The reports are, to my knowledge, devoid of any cases in
which investment bankers zero in on a single number called "intrinsic
value." As Judge Easterbrook has said, "fairness is a range, not a
point."52 It is not surprising that the range of prices usually covers the
price at which the takeout or management buyout is to occur. Judge
Easterbrook has pointed out that a price could be within a range of fair-
ness and still be inadequate, presumably if the investment banker be-
lieved there was a high probability that the winning bid would be in the
upper half of the range.53
Another difficulty with asking investment bankers to predict the hypo-
thetical outcome of an auction is that they are faced with the "Winner's
Curse," which suggests that the winner of any auction is the one who
paid too much.54 "Too much" in these cases is based on the consensus
valuation of the other participants in the auction, all of whom agree that
the winner paid too much. How can an investment banker be expected
accurately to predict an outcome when some behavior is viewed as irra-
tional by most informed observers?
Anecdotal evidence is always suspect, but one example from my own
experience may be helpful in understanding this point. A few years ago,
a potential buyer approached the officers of a small public company. In
the course of two days of intensive negotiations, they struck a deal for a
cash merger, and a board meeting was called to approve the transaction.
The directors were assisted in their evaluations by well-known invest-
ment bankers who had participated in the negotiations and who were
prepared to render a fairness opinion. The essence of the fairness opinion
51. See, eg., Ridings v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. (Bahamas), 94
F.R.D. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); In re Triton
Group Shareholders Litig., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 195,876 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 22, 1991); Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,779 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc.,
[1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $93,502 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987).
52. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
53. Id.
54. See, eg., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. Rev. 597, 625-
26 (1989); James C. Cox & R. Mark Isaac, In Search of the Winner's Curse, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 579-
80; Paul Milgror, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. EON. PERSP., Summer 1989, at 3, 3-4; Paul
Milgrom, Private Information in an Auctionlike Securities Market, in AUCTIONs, BIDDING AND
CONTRACTING: USES AND THEORY 137, 140 (Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. eds., 1983);
Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains From Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the
Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 27-30 (1988).
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was as follows: "We are not prepared to name a range of fairness, much
less a single 'fair' price. The price being offered for your company is so
high it is off any chart we might prepare." In this case, using even the
most optimistic projections of future earnings for the seller, the expected
returns on the purchase price appeared to be below two percent per an-
num. Apparently, the buyer knew something the target did not know
and could not even imagine. Yet placing too much weight on a fairness
opinion assumes that the investment banker will be able to divine all that
information.
Finally, let us examine the hypothetical situation in which the take-out
merger involves a negotiated transaction between the majority share-
holder and independent directors who represent the minority sharehold-
ers. The banker is asked to determine the gains from trade, which
consist in part of agency-cost savings (which cannot be accurately pre-
dicted) plus the gains to the majority shareholder from being freed of
constraints imposed by the presence of minority shareholders,55 less the
corresponding costs of the takeout, which may consist of the increased
risk associated with reduced diversification and higher leverage. The
banker must then predict the outcome of bargaining between the two
parties over how these gains will be shared. Keep in mind that neither
party knows the exact extent of these gains or what the other party be-
lieves those gains to be. In economic terms, they are asked to predict the
situation portrayed by the Edgeworth Box 56-bargaining under condi-
tions of bilateral monopoly-when there is general agreement that the
outcome is indeterminate.
All this suggests that the preparation of a fairness opinion is an art and
not a science. It does not lend itself to the precision of the accountants'
certificate. The creation of due-diligence check lists under these circum-
stances is the creation of an illusion of precision. To expect the courts
skillfully to craft minimum standards of care is to expect too much.
III. INVESTMENT BANKERS AS GATEKEEPERS
Professor Fiflis argues that holding investment bankers liable for negli-
55. For an explanation of the costs of co-ownership, see Carney, supra note 50.
56. See generally ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 47-
49 (3d ed. 1972); see also Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality The
Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE LJ. 49; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and
a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 563-68 (1977).
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gent preparation of fairness opinions is justified by the reliance of share-
holders on investment bankers' opinions. He presents no evidence to
support his assertion, and he misses the point. The real question should
be: Do shareholders have any reason to rely on these opinions? Rather
than answer that question, Professor Fiflis argues instead that bankers
should serve as gatekeepers and that good public policy argues for hold-
ing them liable, since bankers can stop transactions that would be harm-
ful to shareholders.5 7
Professor Fiflis relies on the work of Reinier Kraakman for his gate-
keeper arguments.58 Kraakman's approach focuses on events that are
relatively specific-securities fraud being the primary example.5 9 As I
have tried to argue, nothing is less specific than the question of fairness.
Indeed, Kraakman argues that imposition of gatekeeper liability "re-
quires the prudent crafting of circumscribed duties to monitor and to
respond that, above all, do not ask too much from their targets."'
Nothing could be further from that description than imposing gatekeeper
liability on investment bankers for fairness opinions.
IV. DIFFICULTIES WITH REFORM PROPOSALS
A. The Objections to Reform Proposals
The proposals for reform of the legal rules governing fairness opinions
illustrate what critics think is wrong with them. While some of the pro-
posals seem harmless enough, others would increase the cost of such
opinions and thus would increase the regulatory tax on the transactions
in which they are required. But even the harmless proposals would do
little to further the goals of the critics.
The most modest proposals for reform attempt to set up procedural
safeguards to protect investment bankers from conflicts of interest. To
this extent, they do little more than mirror several court decisions. For
example, these proposals would ban the use of performance fees, tied to
defeat of bids or to success of white-knight transactions, for investment
bankers rendering fairness opinions. 1 One might also expect the critics
to encourage retention of investment bankers for this purpose by in-
57. Fiflis, supra note 1, at 514-15. See also Giuffra, supra note 2, at 125-27 (1986).
58. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857 (1984), cited in Fiflis, supra note 1, at 514 n.75.
59. Kraakman, supra note 58, at 888-96.
60. Id. at 893.
61. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 38-41, 49-51 and cases cited therein.
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dependent directors, rather than by the managers who have proposed a
particular course of action.
The European Economic Community has gone one step further in its
proposals for the harmonization of legal rules governing business combi-
nations. It requires the use of experts appointed by a government agency
for the purpose of rendering a fairness opinion.62 To my knowledge, no
one has yet suggested for American corporations that extreme an aban-
donment of the primary role of the board in selecting experts on whom
they can rely, but it does represent a logical, if extreme, step in eliminat-
ing concerns over conflicts of interest.
The problems with liability rules are the extreme difficulties in formu-
lating useful standards, coupled with the costs imposed on transactions
by the risks and uncertainties created. I have little hope that American
courts can develop a reasonable set of due-diligence standards that will
allow them to impose liability for negligent preparation of fairness opin-
ions without creating such costs. The Delaware courts, for example,
have been noteworthy in their obtuseness in developing valuation tech-
niques in appraisal proceedings. The Delaware Block method of valua-
tion has been cogently criticized as bearing no particular relationship to
values that might be set either by markets or modern financial analysis.63
B. Who Will Protect Shareholders?
Professor Fiflis has described a dilemma that I have thus far evaded: if
directors can gain the shield of the business judgment rule by employing
investment bankers for fairness opinions, and if investment bankers are
not liable to shareholders for negligent preparation, what protects share-
holders? 64 Contracts, markets, independent directors, and courts willing
to set aside unfair transactions can provide protection. New liability
rules are not required for this purpose.
Nothing prevents shareholders from writing contracts to preclude ma-
jority shareholders of a corporation from engaging in a takeout merger or
to forbid managers from engaging in a buyout. Indeed, in the context of
hostile takeover bids, these contracts are well known in the form of
shark-repellent amendments. 65 To suggest that investors cannot obtain
62. European Community, Third Council Directive of 9 Oct. 1978, (78/855/EEC), Ch. II, Art.
10 (Official Journal No. L295).
63. Fischel, supra note 19, at 890-93; Cohen, supra note 19, at 126-27.
64. See, Fiflis, supra note 1, at 506-07.
65. See generally William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and
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such protection is to engage in the notion Frank Easterbrook once de-
scribed as the investor waking up from a deep sleep and saying, "Woe is
me, I'm powerless... ."66 There are any number of ways investors can
contract against takeout mergers, or at least against overreaching in such
mergers.67 It would be as simple to preclude managers from offering to
buy the firm. We do not see such contracts, strongly suggesting that
many such offers benefit shareholders.68
Markets may provide the strongest form of protection for minority
and public shareholders in takeouts and management buyouts. I know of
no case in which shareholders have agreed to a transaction when the
consideration was below the pre-announcement market price. If that is
so, and if there are comparable investments available in the market, in-
vestors are always better off in takeouts and buyouts to which they as-
sent. 69 Even in takeouts in which minority shareholders have no voice,
because the merger is either a short form or is not conditioned on ap-
proval of the minority shareholders, the number of cases in which the
consideration is below the pre-announcement market price is either zero
or trivial. In most cases, even if the consideration were below market
price, shareholders would be protected by appraisal rights, although ad-
mittedly this is not the case in Delaware.70  That such takeouts or
buyouts do not occur even absent such appraisal protection strongly sug-
gests that market forces, not legal rules, are the primary protection for
Takeout Merger" The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J. 341 [hereinaf-
ter Shareholder Coordination Costs]; William J. Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repel-
lents, 4, No. 2 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J., Summer 1986, at 48.
66. Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence,
9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 542 (1984).
67. Carney, supra note 50, at 49-53.
68. See Jeffry Davis & Kenneth Lehn, Information Asymmetries, Rule 13e-3 and Premiums in
Going Private Transactions, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 587 (1992).
69. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982). (This depends on the adoption of efficient decision rules within firms, however. See
Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 65.) I thus reject the thesis of A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
in "Going Private" Seventeen Years Later, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 571 (1992), that going private is nearly
always unfair, because managers or majority shareholders earn some profits that otherwise could
have been earned for all shareholders. That is a form of the Nirvana fallacy, which compares an
ideal world with the second-best position of the real. The point is not that managers could have
earned these profits for all shareholders; they did not, and whatever incentive arrangements the firm
had were insufficient to eliminate this agency cost.
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (1991) (excluding appraisal rights for shareholders in
corporations either listed on a national stock exchange or held of record by 2,000 or more stockhold-
ers). This exception fails to provide protection for shareholders when an announced merger drives
the price of the company's stock down.
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minority shareholders.71
Independent directors are perhaps the most abused group in the corpo-
rate law literature. No one seems to believe in their independence.72 Yet
these directors do not depend for their employment on the insiders pro-
posing takeouts or management buyouts. They are generally individuals
of stature in the corporate world as well as in their own communities,
with a lifetime of reputational capital built up. As the dissenting judge in
the Trans Union case put it, they are unlikely to be taken by a "fast
shuffle." 73 There is evidence in the reports of vigorous representation of
public or minority shareholders under the circumstances we are discuss-
ing.74 Davis & Lehn's work in this Symposium provides evidence that
there are no significant differences in results for public shareholders when
management or third parties engage in buyouts.75
The best evidence of the performance of boards is found in the battles
for corporate control in the 1980s. In virtually all cases, incumbent man-
agement was a competing bidder for control.76 Despite these conflicts of
interest, huge gains were obtained for target shareholders throughout the
decade.77 Firms found it possible to structure the incentives of manage-
ment and directors to perform well for shareholders by providing them
with forms of compensation related to shareholder welfare.7" If disloy-
71. However, nothing in Weinberger would preclude judicial action setting aside such a merger.
72. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTHS AND REALITY (1971); James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985).
73. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 894 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout, in which management complained that the
special committee of the board favored not the inside bidders, but the outsiders. In re RJR Nabisco,
Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-90 TRANSFER BINDER] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 94,194 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 31, 1989).
75. Davis & Lehn, supra note 68, at 595-96.
76. Michael L. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (1983).
77. Bernard S. Black & Joseph A. Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restruc-
turings Between 1981 and 1986: $162 Billion Is A Lot of Money, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5 (1988)
(estimating gains for shareholders at $162 billion between 1981 and 1986). See also Jensen & Rubak,
supra note 76, at 10-14 (average bid premiums of 29% in hostile bids and 15.9% in mergers); Brad-
ley, supra note 54, at 11; Debra K. Dennis & John J. McConnell, Corporate Mergers and Security
Returns, 16 J. FIN. EON. 143 (1986).
78. Carney, supra note 13, at 429 (citing Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, Strategic
Issues in Cash Tender Offers: Predicting Bid Premiums, Probability of Success, and Target Manage-
ment's Response, 4, No. 2 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 57, Summer 1986, at 63-64; Ralph A. Walkling
& Michael S. Long, Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RAND J.
EcoN. 54 (1984)).
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alty of outside directors is a perceived problem, nothing prevents provid-
ing the outsiders with a compensation arrangement that keys their
wealth to the welfare of the public or minority shareholders. Indeed,
more and more boards take part or all of their compensation in the form
of stock, options, or other stock-related compensation. This means they
find their wealth keyed to that of the public investors, if they are not
included in the insider group. If they are included in the insider group,
then they are no longer independent for purposes of the buyout or take-
out decision.
The final source of protection, when private arrangements fail, is the
courts. If the courts observe a process dominated by insiders, in which
the insiders select the investment bankers and counsel for the special
committee, and in which the committee is supine in the face of an offer
from the insiders, then the courts have shown themselves capable of set-
ting aside such transactions.79
V. CONCLUSION
It would be wonderful if a few procedural reforms or imposition of
legal liability could improve the accuracy of fairness opinions. Some
modest changes may be quite harmless and relatively inexpensive. But
any radical changes in this area will only increase costs and risks for
participants in corporate transactions without delivering the promised
truth about values. No one, unfortunately, has such truth until values
are revealed in markets by real, rather than hypothetical, transactions.
79. See, eag., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1989) (de-
clining to allow a special committee to rely in good faith upon financial and legal advisors chosen by
the management team that was a competing bidder for the company).
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